The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
MERCHANT TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT*
Open accessAbstract
We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on ‘market driven’ investment to increase transmission network capacity needed to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model has a remarkable set of attributes that appears to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating electric transmission companies. We expand the merchant model to incorporate several attributes of wholesale power markets and transmission networks that the merchant model ignores. These include market power in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, strategic behavior by potential merchant transmission investors and issues related to the coordination of transmission system operators and merchant transmission owners. Incorporating these more realistic attributes of transmission networks and the behavior of transmission owners and system operators leads to the conclusion that several potentially significant inefficiencies may result from reliance on the merchant transmission investment framework. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for policymakers to assume that they can avoid dealing with the many challenges associated with stimulating efficient levels of investment in electric transmission networks by adopting the merchant model.
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Citations
Cites
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole, Z., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 3,154
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
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Hansmann, H. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1pncrw1 · Cited by 1,427
Contract networks for electric power transmission
Hogan, W. W. (1992) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/bf00133621 · Cited by 959
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297660 · Cited by 909
Self-citationContracts as a barrier to entry
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. G. M. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 729
Wilson, R. B. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00334 · Cited by 580
Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks
Joskow, P. L., & Tirole, J. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2600996 · Cited by 554
Self-citation
Cited by
Facilitating Transmission Expansion to Support Efficient Decarbonization of the Electricity Sector
Joskow, P. L. (2022) · Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy · doi:10.5547/2160-5890.10.2.pjos · Cited by 29
Self-citationCompetition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000
Joskow, P. L. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Energy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_10 · Cited by 12
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Joskow, P., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-06
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 233-264
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6451
- OpenAlex
- W2104515601
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 18.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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