The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
III-Faultless Disagreement
Abstract
There seem to be topics on which people can disagree without fault. For example, you and I might disagree on whether Picasso was a better artist than Matisse, without either of us being at fault. Is this a genuine possibility or just apparent? In this paper I pursue two aims: I want to provide a systematic map of available responses to this question. Simultaneously, I want to assess these responses. I start by introducing and defining the notion of a faultless disagreement. Then I present a simple argument to the conclusion that faultless disagreement is not possible. Those who accept the argument have to explain away apparent cases of faultless disagreement. Those who want to maintain the possibility of faultless disagreement must deny one of the argument's premisses. The position I want to promote belongs to the latter category and is a form of genuine relativism.
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Cites
Wright, C. (2009) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1rr6cwg · Cited by 1,437
Blackburn, S. (1984) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 713
Abrams, D., Sheeran, P., Abraham, C., & Spears, R. (1992) · AIDS Care · doi:10.1080/09540129208253097 · Cited by 362
On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism
Wright, C. (2001) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/110.437.45 · Cited by 241
Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity
Sainsbury, R. M., & Wright, C. (1996) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108291 · Cited by 66
Relativism and Classical Logic
Wright, C. (2002) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246100008109 · Cited by 4
(1986)
Cited by
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
Khoo, J., & Knobe, J. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12151 · Cited by 82
Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
Denning, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2022) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht202341718
Metadata
- Authors
- Kölbel, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-06
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-73
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9264
- OpenAlex
- W2163550134
- Cited by
- 329
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 45.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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