The DOI matches its Crossref record.
I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?
Abstract
My life consists in my being content to accept many things (Wittgenstein On Certainty x344) Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. ‘Entitlement’, as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exempli.es that identi.cation. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three kinds of entitlement are characterised and given prima facie support, and a fourth is canvassed. Certain foreseeable limitations of the suggested anti-sceptical strategy are noted. The discussion is grounded, overall, in a conception of the sceptical paradoxes not as directly challenging our having any warrant for large classes of our beliefs but as crises of intellectual conscience for one who wants to claim that we do.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001 · Cited by 454
Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
SMITHIES, D. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00506.x · Cited by 275
White, R. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, C.
- Venue
- Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-07-01
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 167-212
- ISSN
- 0309-7013 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8349
- OpenAlex
- W1966307040
- Cited by
- 712
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 99.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x
- The paper
- Wright, C. (2004). I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.