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Cited by 101Knowledge Management and SharingWikis in Education and CollaborationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The Social Psychological Effects of Feedback on the Production of Internet Information Pools

Open access
Cheshire, Coye, Antin, Judd·2008·Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication
DOI 10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00416.x
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Abstract

A growing number of systems on the Internet create what we call information pools, or collections of online information goods for public, club or private consumption. Examples of information pools include collaborative editing websites (e.g. Wikipedia), peer-to-peer file sharing networks (e.g., Napster), multimedia contribution sites (e.g. YouTube), and amorphous collections of commentary (e.g., blogs). In this study, we specifically focus on information pools that create a public good. Following current theory and research, we argue that extremely low costs of contribution combined with very large networks of distribution facilitate the production of online information pools—despite an abundance of free-riding behavior. This paper presents results from a series of Internet field experiments that examine the effects of various feedback mechanisms on repeat contributions to an information pool. We demonstrate that the social psychological benefits from gratitude, historical reminders of past behavior, and ranking of one’s contributions relative to those of others can significantly increase repeat contributions. In addition, the context in which individuals interact with the system may partially mitigate the positive effect of some types of feedback on contribution behavior.

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  • Crowdworkers perform better when they are intrinsically motivated by the task's importance.

    “First, crowdworkers perform better when they are intrinsically motivated by the task's importance [Cheshire and Antin 2008].”

    From Peer and self assessment in massive online classes (2013) · cites this paper as Cheshire and Antin 2008

    The Discussion (page unavailable) says that high intrinsic motivation can sustain contributions and that added incentives may reduce them. But the paper discusses contributors to online information pools, not crowdworkers, and does not establish that motivation arising from a task’s importance improves their performance. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Research works printed but not linked: 27

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Authors
Cheshire, C., & Antin, J.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2008-04
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
705-727
ISSN
1083-6101 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00416.x
OpenAlex
W2074940289
Cited by
101
References
1
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 9
FWCI
38.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 2709 d)
Locations
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Knowledge Management and Sharing
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Wikis in Education and Collaboration
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
public goods, free-riding, feedback mechanisms, gratitude, social comparison, social psychology, collaborative editing, peer-to-peer file sharing, blogs, YouTube, Wikipedia, field experiments

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