Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade‐off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private‐good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications*
McWilliams, A., Siegel, D. S., & Wright, P. M. (2006) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00580.x · Cited by 3,154
“The use of CSR to capture value is referred to as strategic CSR by Baron (2001) who points out that ‘it is the motivation for the action that identifies socially, as opposed to privately, responsible action’.”
BackgroundMethodCorporate responsibility and financial performance: The role of intangible resources
Surroca, J., Tribó, J. A., & Waddock, S. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.820 · Cited by 2,252
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Albuquerque, R., Koskinen, Y., & Zhang, C. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3043 · Cited by 2,204
Socially responsible investments: Institutional aspects, performance, and investor behavior
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Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility
Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.51 · Cited by 1,116
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-445
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W2032427874
- Cited by
- 583
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 21.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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