The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONS
Abstract
The Pareto optimality and price behavior of English and Dutch oral auctions, and First-Price and Second-Price sealedbid auctions are compared under various procedures for assigning valuations among cash motivated bidders. The Vickrey propositions with respect to the mean and variance of prices under the English, Dutch and Second-Price auctions are not falsified by the data. Individual behavior and prices in the First-Price auction deviates considerably from Vickrey's Nash postulate. Behaviorly, the English and Second-Price auctions appear to be isomorphic, but the Dutch and First-Price auctions may not be isomorphic.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Cited by
Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1063 · Cited by 446
Metadata
- Authors
- COPPINGER, V. M., SMITH, V. L., & TITUS, J. A.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1980-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-22
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2124713638
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1980.tb00556.x
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- COPPINGER, V. M., SMITH, V. L., & TITUS, J. A. (1980). INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONS. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1980.tb00556.x
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