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DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATES

GILLIGAN, THOMAS W., MATSUSAKA, JOHN G.·1995·Economic Inquiry

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960—1990. Recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires. Our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state's legislature. This is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like. We also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure, but do influence the composition of spending. In particular, Democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending.

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Metadata

Authors
GILLIGAN, T. W., & MATSUSAKA, J. G.
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1995-07
Volume
33
Issue
3
Pages
383-401
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
OpenAlex
W2040083199
Cited by
167
References
0
FWCI
8.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATES. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01870.x
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GILLIGAN, T. W., & MATSUSAKA, J. G. (1995). DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATES. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01870.x

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