The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Abstract
A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This Paper has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes. It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of political economy. Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and re-examines some of the claims made, in a setting unified both in terms of policy outcomes and the period under study. Third, the paper develops some new directions for research, presenting a small number of novel exploratory results.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555136 · Cited by 1,649
Self-citationMeasuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., Fording, R. C., & Hanson, R. L. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991759 · Cited by 1,592
The control of politicians: An economic model
Barro, R. J. (1973) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718440 · Cited by 1,553
The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States
Walker, J. L. (1969) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400258644 · Cited by 1,535
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
Osborne, M. J., & Slivinski, A. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946658 · Cited by 1,246
Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence
Case, A. C., Rosen, H. S., & Hines, J. R. (1993) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(93)90036-s · Cited by 1,220
Self-citation
Cited by
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603770383424 · Cited by 445
Self-citationPolicy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014
CAUGHEY, D., & WARSHAW, C. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000533 · Cited by 340
The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936–2014
Caughey, D., & Warshaw, C. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12219 · Cited by 271
Metadata
- Authors
- Besley, T., & Case, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-03
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 7-73
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2097164000
- Cited by
- 401
- References
- 76
- FWCI
- 119.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/jel.41.1.7
- The paper
- Besley, T., & Case, A. (2003). Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States. Journal of Economic Literature. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.41.1.7
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
