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MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING

WIMMER, BRADLEY S., GAREN, JOHN E. · 1997 · Economic Inquiry
Cited by 61

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In franchising, many of the elements of moral hazard models merge. Issues of two‐sided moral hazard, bonding, and asset specificity all play a role. We extend the literature by considering how asset specificity creates an implicit bond and affects incentive pay. This approach implies that if one party posts a larger bond, this improves their incentives and allows enhancement of the other party's incentives through a larger residual income claim. Our empirical work supports this approach. For example, reductions in the specificity of the franchisee's investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee. (JEL L14, 533)

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Metadata

Authors
WIMMER, B. S., & GAREN, J. E.
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1997-07
Volume
35
Issue
3
Pages
544-554
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
OpenAlex
W2112333258
Cited by
61
References
5
FWCI
5.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02031.x
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WIMMER, B. S., & GAREN, J. E. (1997). MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02031.x

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