MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In franchising, many of the elements of moral hazard models merge. Issues of two‐sided moral hazard, bonding, and asset specificity all play a role. We extend the literature by considering how asset specificity creates an implicit bond and affects incentive pay. This approach implies that if one party posts a larger bond, this improves their incentives and allows enhancement of the other party's incentives through a larger residual income claim. Our empirical work supports this approach. For example, reductions in the specificity of the franchisee's investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee. (JEL L14, 533)
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Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
Brickley, J. A., & Dark, F. H. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90046-8 · Cited by 1,076
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
Caves, R. E., & II, W. F. M. (1976) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056250 · Cited by 694
Cited by
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
Chen, P.-Y., Chen, K.-Y., & Wu, L.-Y. (2017) · Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing · doi:10.1108/jbim-09-2014-0171 · Cited by 85
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
“in the Workplace”
Metadata
- Authors
- WIMMER, B. S., & GAREN, J. E.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 544-554
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2112333258
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 5.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02031.x
- The paper
- WIMMER, B. S., & GAREN, J. E. (1997). MORAL HAZARD, ASSET SPECIFICITY, IMPLICIT BONDING, AND COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02031.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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