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The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing
Abstract
Our study provides the first national analysis of the labour market implications of workers who are licensed by any agency of the government in the USA. Using a specially designed Gallup survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans, we provide an analysis of the influence of this form of occupational regulation. We find that 29 per cent of the workforce is required to hold a licence, which is a higher percentage than that found in other studies that rely on state‐level occupational licensing data or single states. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a licence. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a licence requirement than are non‐union or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions — that is about 15 per cent — and that being both licensed and in a union can increase wages by more than 24 per cent. However, unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.
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Holders of occupational licenses earn between 11% and 18% more than their unlicensed counterparts.
“Holders of occupational licenses earn between 11% and 18% more than their unlicensed counterparts, presumably because it restricts the supply of labor (Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013).”
From Occupational Licensing and Maternal Health: Evidence from Early Midwifery Laws (2020) · cites this paper as Kleiner and Krueger 2010
Citations
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 12
- Brinegar P., 1992, The Book of the States, 1992–1993, 567
- Council of State Governments, 1952, Occupational Licensing Legislation in the States
- Dunlop J. T., 1958, Industrial Relations Systems
- Freeman R., 1999, Do unions make enterprises insolvent?, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52, 507, 10.1177/001979399905200401 · DOI
- Freeman R. B., 1982, Union wage practices and wage dispersion within establishments, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 36, 3, 10.1177/001979398203600101 · DOI
- Freeman R. B., 1984, What Do Unions Do?
- Friedman M., 1962, Capitalism and Freedom
- Fuchs V. R., 1998, Economists' views about parameters, values, and policies: survey results in labor and public economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 1387
- Halvorsen R., 1980, The interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic equations, The American Economic Review, 70, 474
- Kleiner M. M., 2006, Licensing Occupations: Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition?, 10.17848/9781429454865 · DOI
- Lewis H. G., 1986, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey
- 10.2307/2297722 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market
Kleiner, M. M., & Krueger, A. B. (2013) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/669060 · Cited by 407
Self-citationOccupational Licensing and Maternal Health: Evidence from Early Midwifery Laws
Anderson, D. M., Brown, R., Charles, K. K., & Rees, D. I. (2020) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/710555 · Cited by 98
Anderson, D. M., Brown, R., Charles, K. K., & Rees, D. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22456 · Cited by 19
Long-Term Health Benefits of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Midwifery Laws
Noghanibehambari, H., & Fletcher, J. (2023) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102807 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Kleiner, M. M., & Krueger, A. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Minnesota (US)
- United States Department of the Treasury (US)
- ORCID
- Kleiner, Morris M.
- Venue
- British Journal of Industrial Relations
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-07-27
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 676-687
- ISSN
- 0007-1080 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8543
- OpenAlex
- W3122110150
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 26.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- British Journal of Industrial Relations (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Occupational and Professional Licensing Regulation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Labor Movements and Unions
- Keywords
- professional licensing, labor market regulation, wage effects, union wage premium, wage dispersion, unionized workers, public sector employees, United States
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