The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Outside Directors, Ownership Structure and Firm Profitability in Korea
Abstract
The contribution of outside directors to firm performance has been shown to be inconsistent. Korean companies first began in 1998 to introduce outside directors to carry out governance reform. This paper analyses the impact of outside directors on corporate performance during the governance reform movement undertaken in Korea in 1999 as well as the moderating effect of the large shareholder and managerial ownership rate. We hypothesised a positive relationship between outside director effectiveness (outside director participation rate) and firm profitability, a negative moderating effect in terms of large shareholder ownership and managerial ownership, and a positive moderating effect when it comes to blockholder ownership. This moderating relationship is considered in order to investigate the role of large shareholders under the Korean governance structure. Our empirical analysis showed that outside directors had a weak positive impact, and that a large shareholder ownership rate and a block shareholder ownership rate moderated this relationship in a negative fashion. The managerial ownership rate did not show any significant moderating effects. We thus conclude that it is too early to assess the impact of outside directors on corporate performance, and that Korean companies exhibit an “owner‐controlled” governance structure; that is, they are governed by large shareholders who have demonstrated a resistance to attempts to bring about governance reform through such means as the introduction of outside directors. Outside shareholders were found to possess insufficient power to monitor large controlling shareholders. This paper seeks to make a contribution to the field by conducting an analysis of governance structure in Korea in the aftermath of the currency crisis, as well as of outside directors in emerging economies, a subject rarely dealt with in governance studies.
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Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 2×
“Meanwhile, large shareholdings in some form or other are the norm in the rest of the world (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).”
BackgroundAgency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
Chang, S. J. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040617 · Cited by 550 · cited 3×
“The positive relationship between a large shareholder ownership rate and profitability found in this analysis is consistent with Chang (2003).”
BackgroundResult
Cited by
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from Korea
Oh, W. Y., Chang, Y. K., & Martynov, A. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0912-z · Cited by 727
Ownership structure, board of directors and firm performance: evidence from Taiwan
Kao, M.-F., Hodgkinson, L., & Jaafar, A. (2019) · Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society · doi:10.1108/cg-04-2018-0144 · Cited by 389
Exploring the Relationship Between Board Characteristics and CSR: Empirical Evidence from Korea
Chang, Y. K., Oh, W.-Y., Park, J. H., & Jang, M. G. (2017) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2651-z · Cited by 341
The Measurements of Firm Performance’s Dimensions
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Fadzil, F. H. B. (2014) · Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting · doi:10.5296/ajfa.v6i1.4761 · Cited by 309
Corporate Governance and Tobin's Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance
Singh, S., Tabassum, N., Darwish, T. K., & Batsakis, G. (2018) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12237 · Cited by 308
Metadata
- Authors
- Cho, D., & Kim, J.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 239-250
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2045165553
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 25.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.