The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper analyzes the role of boards of directors in constraining research and development (R&D) spending manipulation. Extant research on earnings management indicates that independent directors reduce accounting accruals manipulation; however, there is little evidence on their effectiveness in limiting potentially value reducing R&D cuts motivated by short‐term earnings pressures. Research Findings/Results: Using a large sample of UK firms, I study whether independent boards are efficient at detecting and constraining myopic R&D cuts. The results indicate that more independent boards constrain the manipulation of R&D expenditure. The research design controls for the potential confounding effect of the decision to capitalize vs. expense R&D outlays. Theoretical Implications: The results indicate that independent directors have sufficient technical knowledge to identify opportunistic reductions in R&D, and efficiently constrain opportunistic R&D spending. Practical Implications: The evidence supports the emphasis that recent policy statements have put on increasing the number of independent directors on corporate boards. This study offers insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the monitoring role of corporate boards.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260061 · Cited by 14,258
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Detecting Earnings Management.
Dechow, P., & Sloan, R. G. (1995) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9505096112 · Cited by 5,662
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
Klein, A. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 · Cited by 4,622
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G., & SWEENEY, A. P. (1996) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x · Cited by 4,065
The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings
Opler, T. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00003-3 · Cited by 3,914
Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Family Ownership, Board Independence, and R&D Investment
Chen, H.-L., & Hsu, W.-T. (2009) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486509341062 · Cited by 533
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, M., & Cho, C. H. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1331-5 · Cited by 434
Metadata
- Authors
- Osma, B. G.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 116-131
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2103364700
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 20.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00672.x
- The paper
- Osma, B. G. (2008). Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00672.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.