Cited by 155Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy, Science, and History

WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?

Huemer, Michael·2009·The Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract

Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.569.x

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  • Principles of ontological parsimony are controversial.

    “Such principles are controversial (Huemer 2009; Sober 2009; Kriegel 2013: 18 ff.; Metcalf 2016)”

    From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Huemer 2009

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Authors
Huemer, M.
Affiliations
University of Colorado Boulder (US)
Corresponding author
Huemer, Michael
Venue
The Philosophical Quarterly
Published
2009-04
Volume
59
Issue
235
Pages
216-236
ISSN
  • 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9213
OpenAlex
W2076676501
Cited by
155
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 5
FWCI
12.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
Keywords
parsimony, physicalism, nominalism, empirical theories, evidentiary value, philosophy of science, metaphysics

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