CoChat

PERCEPTION AND THE REACH OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT

Open access
Bayne, Tim · 2009 · The Philosophical Quarterly
Cited by 345

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high‐level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ‘No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ‘Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high‐level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.631.x

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Metadata

Authors
Bayne, T.
Venue
The Philosophical Quarterly
Published
2009-07
Volume
59
Issue
236
Pages
385-404
ISSN
  • 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9213
OpenAlex
W1981278479
Cited by
345
References
0
FWCI
6.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: PERCEPTION AND THE REACH OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.631.x
The paper
Bayne, T. (2009). PERCEPTION AND THE REACH OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.631.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.