The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?
Abstract
In order to update candidate evaluations voters must acquire information and determine whether that new information supports or opposes their candidate expectations. Normatively, new negative information about a preferred candidate should result in a downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies show exactly the opposite; voters become more supportive of a preferred candidate in the face of negatively valenced information. Motivated reasoning is advanced as the explanation, arguing that people are psychologically motivated to maintain and support existing evaluations. Yet it seems unlikely that voters do this ad infinitum. To do so would suggest continued motivated reasoning even in the face of extensive disconfirming information. In this study we consider whether motivated reasoning processes can be overcome simply by continuing to encounter information incongruent with expectations. If so, voters must reach a tipping point after which they begin more accurately updating their evaluations. We show experimental evidence that such an affective tipping point does in fact exist. We also show that as this tipping point is reached, anxiety increases, suggesting that the mechanism that generates the tipping point and leads to more accurate updating may be related to the theory of affective intelligence. The existence of a tipping point suggests that voters are not immune to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as motivated reasoners.
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Cites
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“Previous studies have shown the NA scale itself to be a good measure of anxious states (Crawford and Henry, 2004; Mehrabian, 1997) and it is widely used in social psychology.”
BackgroundLodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2005) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00426.x · Cited by 588
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When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2 · Cited by 3,173
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011 · Cited by 2,022
The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics
Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12394 · Cited by 1,183
Media and Political Polarization
Prior, M. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242 · Cited by 1,125
Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2014) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12164 · Cited by 722
Metadata
- Authors
- Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, A. J. W., & Emmerson, K. M.
- Venue
- Political Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-07-12
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 563-593
- ISSN
- 0162-895X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9221
- OpenAlex
- W1519575580
- Cited by
- 571
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 100.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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