A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege.
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Citations
Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511841286 · Cited by 6,103
Cited by
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2014) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 · Cited by 1,232
Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis
Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014) · Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2 · Cited by 749
Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
Fricker, M. (2016) · The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance · doi:10.1017/9780511820076.010 · Cited by 243
A Third Conception of Epistemic Injustice
Nikolaidis, A. C. (2021) · Studies in Philosophy and Education · doi:10.1007/s11217-021-09760-1 · Cited by 28
Whose Hermeneutical Marginalization?
Clanchy, N. (2023) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2023.16 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Beeby, L.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-10
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 3pt3
- Pages
- 479-486
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2024382970
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 1.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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