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Cited by 11Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesHermeneutics and Narrative IdentityEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Whose Hermeneutical Marginalization?

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Clanchy, Nick·2023·Episteme
DOI 10.1017/epi.2023.16
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Abstract

According to Miranda Fricker, being hindered from rendering something significant about oneself intelligible to someone constitutes a hermeneutical injustice only if it results from the hermeneutical marginalization of some group to which one belongs. A major problem for Fricker's picture is that it cannot properly account for the paradigm case of hermeneutical injustice Fricker herself takes from Ian McEwan's novel Enduring Love. In order to account properly for this case, I argue that being hindered from rendering something significant about oneself intelligible to someone can constitute a hermeneutical injustice so long as it results from the hermeneutical marginalization of some group – whether or not one belongs to that group. One upshot is that Fricker's distinction between systematic and incidental cases of hermeneutical injustice needs redrawing, and I show how this can be done. Another is that hermeneutical injustice is more widespread than Fricker recognizes.

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  33. Nick Clanchy is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford, where he is completing a thesis on hermen- eutical injustice under the supervision of Prof. Amia Srinivasan and Dr Rachel Fraser. He has additional research interests in the work of Roland Barthes and the philosophy of love. Cite this article: Clanchy N (2023). Whose Hermeneutical Marginalization? Episteme 20, 813-832. https:// doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.16

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Authors
Clanchy, N.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Clanchy, Nick
ORCID
Clanchy, Nick
Venue
Episteme
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2023-04-11
Volume
20
Issue
3
Pages
813-832
ISSN
  • 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
  • 1750-0117
DOI
10.1017/epi.2023.16
OpenAlex
W4364375523
Cited by
11
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1
FWCI
4.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Episteme (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
hermeneutical injustice, Miranda Fricker, Ian McEwan, Enduring Love, social epistemology, marginalized communities

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