VIII-F iction as a G enre
Abstract
Standard theories define fiction in terms of an invited response of imagining or make-believe. I argue that these theories are not only subject to numerous counterexamples, they also fail to explain why classification matters to our understanding and evaluation of works of fiction as well as non-fiction. I propose instead that we construe fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a cluster of non-essential criteria, and which play a role in the appreciation of particular works. I claim that this proposal captures the intuitions motivating alternative theories of fiction.
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There is widespread agreement that non-fiction standardly aims for accurate representation and invites belief, whereas fiction standardly invites readers to imagine what is not the case.
“Although the contrast between fiction and non-fiction is contested, there is widespread agreement that works of non-fiction standardly aim for accurate representation and invite belief, whereas works of fiction standardly invite readers to imagine what is not the case (see e.g.Friend, 2012).”
From The effects of reading narrative fiction on social and moral cognition (2021) · cites this paper as Friend, 2012
Cites
The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives.
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.701 · Cited by 4,861 · see citing works
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The effects of reading narrative fiction on social and moral cognition
Wimmer, L., Currie, G., Friend, S., & Ferguson, H. J. (2021) · Scientific Study of Literature · doi:10.1075/ssol.21010.wim · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Friend, S.
- Affiliations
- Heythrop College, University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Friend, Stacie
- ORCID
- Friend, Stacie
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-07
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 2pt2
- Pages
- 179-209
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1843387970
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 3 · 2013: 5
- FWCI
- 20.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (publishedVersion)
- BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Literature and Literary Theory › Narrative Theory and Analysis
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Literature and Literary Theory › Literary Theory and Cultural Hermeneutics
- Keywords
- fiction, genre theory, pretense, imagination, essentialism, aesthetic appreciation, philosophy of fiction
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