The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
Abstract
Should people be considered organ donors after their death unless they request not to be, or should they not be considered donors unless they request to be? Because people tend to stay with the default in a variety of domains, policymakers' choice of default has large and often important effects. In the United States, where the organ-donation policy default is “not a donor,” about 5,000 people die every year because there are too few donors. Four experiments examined two domains—being an organ donor and saving for retirement—where default effects occur and have important implications. The results indicate that default effects occur in part because policymakers' attitudes can be revealed through their choice of default, and people perceive the default as indicating the recommended course of action. Policymakers need to be aware of the implicit messages conveyed by their choice of default.
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Metadata
- Authors
- McKenzie, C. R. M., Liersch, M. J., & Finkelstein, S. R.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 414-420
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2126169472
- Cited by
- 518
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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