The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron
Open accessAbstract
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people’s preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.
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Cites
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A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics
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Self-citationWhat Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)
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Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic
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Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions
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Self-citationIntroduction to regression analysis
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Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron
Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.405940 · Cited by 403
Self-citation
Cited by
Affect, risk, and decision making.
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005) · Health Psychology · doi:10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.s35 · Cited by 1,041
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use
Wilson, C., & Dowlatabadi, H. (2007) · Annual Review of Environment and Resources · doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.32.053006.141137 · Cited by 818
Hansen, P. G., & Jespersen, A. M. (2013) · European Journal of Risk Regulation · doi:10.1017/s1867299x00002762 · Cited by 773
Chater, N., & Loewenstein, G. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002023 · Cited by 710
Metadata
- Authors
- Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H.
- Venue
- The University of Chicago Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1159
- ISSN
- 0041-9494 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3021589323
- Cited by
- 1,288
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 15.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
