The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing
Abstract
Ethical decision making is vulnerable to the forces of automaticity. People behave differently in the face of a potential loss versus a potential gain, even when the two situations are transparently identical. Across three experiments, decision makers engaged in more unethical behavior if a decision was presented in a loss frame than if the decision was presented in a gain frame. In Experiment 1 , participants in the loss-frame condition were more likely to favor gathering “insider information” than were participants in the gain-frame condition. In Experiment 2 , negotiators in the loss-frame condition lied more than negotiators in the gain-frame condition. In Experiment 3 , the tendency to be less ethical in the loss-frame condition occurred under time pressure and was eliminated through the removal of time pressure.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 4×
“We turned to framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) as the foundation of our inquiry.”
InfluentialThe emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194
Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility.
Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0025589 · Cited by 3,083
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945
Cited by
Why employees do bad things: Moral disengagement and unethical organizational behavior
MOORE, C., DETERT, J. R., KLEBE TREVIÑO, L., BAKER, V. L., & MAYER, D. M. (2012) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2011.01237.x · Cited by 1,159
Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty
Bazerman, M. H., & Gino, F. (2012) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102811-173815 · Cited by 310
Moore, C., Mayer, D. M., Chiang, F. F. T., Crossley, C., Karlesky, M. J., & Birtch, T. A. (2019) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/apl0000341 · Cited by 292
Worth the Risk? Greater Acceptance of Instrumental Harm Befalling Men than Women
Graso, M., Reynolds, T., & Aquino, K. (2023) · Archives of Sexual Behavior · doi:10.1007/s10508-023-02571-0 · Cited by 10
“Yet, in line with the bounded nature of moral judgment (Kern & Chugh, 2009), the sacrificial individual’s gender sways observers’ judgments.”
BackgroundFischer, S., & Grosch, K. (2025) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Kern, M. C., & Chugh, D.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-03
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 378-384
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2114420714
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 10.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.