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Cited by 350

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

HELLWIG, CHRISTIAN, VELDKAMP, LAURA · 2009 · Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: if an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modelling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

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Metadata

Authors
HELLWIG, C., & VELDKAMP, L.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2009-01
Volume
76
Issue
1
Pages
223-251
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W3021036241
Cited by
350
References
43
FWCI
23.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x
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HELLWIG, C., & VELDKAMP, L. (2009). Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.