The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
Abstract
We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: if an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modelling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.
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Cites
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Lucas, R. E. (1972) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1 · Cited by 4,740
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Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Mankiw, N. G., & Reis, R. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302320935034 · Cited by 2,292
Social Value of Public Information
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024610 · Cited by 1,967
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261849 · Cited by 1,805
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
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Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs
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Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short‐Term Speculation
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Cited by
Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention
Maćkowiak, B., & Wiederholt, M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.769 · Cited by 963
How Do Firms Form Their Expectations? New Survey Evidence
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., & Kumar, S. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20151299 · Cited by 582
Rational Inattention: A Review
Maćkowiak, B., Matějka, F., & Wiederholt, M. (2023) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20211524 · Cited by 356
Business Cycle Dynamics under Rational Inattention
Maćkowiak, B., & Wiederholt, M. (2015) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv027 · Cited by 335
Gabaix, X. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.11.001 · Cited by 329
Metadata
- Authors
- HELLWIG, C., & VELDKAMP, L.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 223-251
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3021036241
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 23.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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