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Cited by 1,663

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models

Cooper, Russell, John, Andrew·1988·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/1885539
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. Strategic complementarities arise when the optimal strategy of an agent depends positively upon the strategies of the other agents. We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We then place additional economic content on the analysis of this game by considering strategic complementarities arising from production functions, matching technologies, and commodity demand functions in a multisector, imperfectly competitive economy.

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Metadata

Authors
Cooper, R., & John, A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1988-08
Volume
103
Issue
3
Pages
441
ISSN
0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/1885539
OpenAlex
W2132499788
Cited by
1,663
References
0
FWCI
64.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1885539
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Cooper, R., & John, A. (1988). Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885539

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.