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Cited by 242

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Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions

LI, TONG, ZHENG, XIAOYONG·2009·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procurement cost may rise because the "entry effect" is always positive and may dominate the negative "competition effect". We then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration, controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity, and use the recently developed semi-parametric Bayesian estimation method to analyse the data. We select the model that best fits the data, and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the "entry effect" and the "competition effect" with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.

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Metadata

Authors
LI, T., & ZHENG, X.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2009-10
Volume
76
Issue
4
Pages
1397-1429
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W2146779546
Cited by
242
References
1
FWCI
20.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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LI, T., & ZHENG, X. (2009). Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00558.x

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