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Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game of Complete Information
Open accessAbstract
We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. We demonstrate that the model is identified under weak functional form assumptions using exclusion restrictions and an identification at infinity approach. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately sized samples. As an application, we study entry decisions by construction contractors to bid on highway projects in California. We find that an equilibrium is more likely to be observed if it maximizes joint profits, has a higher Nash product, uses mixed strategies, and is not Pareto dominated by another equilibrium.
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Cites
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McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
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Discrete Choice with Social Interactions
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Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Modeling Lane-Changing Behavior in a Connected Environment: A Game Theory Approach
Talebpour, A., Mahmassani, H. S., & Hamdar, S. H. (2015) · Transportation Research Procedia · doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2015.06.022 · Cited by 283
Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
Bajari, P., Hong, H., Krainer, J., & Nekipelov, D. (2010) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2009.07264 · Cited by 267
Microeconometrics with partial identification
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Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1529-1568
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118944179
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 32.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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