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A DEFENCE OF CONSTRUCTIONISM: PHILOSOPHY AS CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

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FLORIDI, LUCIANO · 2011 · Metaphilosophy

Abstract

This article offers an account and defence of constructionism, both as a metaphilosophical approach and as a philosophical methodology, with references to the so‐called maker's knowledge tradition. Its main thesis is that Plato's “user's knowledge” tradition should be complemented, if not replaced, by a constructionist approach to philosophical problems in general and to knowledge in particular. Epistemic agents know something when they are able to build (reproduce, simulate, model, construct, etc.) that something and plug the obtained information into the correct network of relations that account for it. Their epistemic expertise increases with the scope and depth of the questions that they are able to ask and answer. Thus, constructionism deprioritises mimetic, passive, and declarative knowledge that something is the case, in favour of poietic, interactive, and practical knowledge of something being the case. Metaphilosophically, constructionism suggests adding conceptual engineering to conceptual analysis as a fundamental method.

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Metadata

Authors
FLORIDI, L.
Venue
Metaphilosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-04
Volume
42
Issue
3
Pages
282-304
ISSN
  • 0026-1068 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9973
OpenAlex
W1521903627
Cited by
163
References
0
FWCI
66.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A DEFENCE OF CONSTRUCTIONISM: PHILOSOPHY AS CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01693.x
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FLORIDI, L. (2011). A DEFENCE OF CONSTRUCTIONISM: PHILOSOPHY AS CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING. Metaphilosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01693.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.