Do Children Understand the Mind by Means of Simulation or a Theory? Evidence From Their Understanding of Inference
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Three experiments investigating children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge and beliefs were used to determine whether children use a theory in understanding the mind. A child watched while a sweet was placed in a box whereas a doll was merely given a message about which sweet had been transferred. Children were asked to judge whether the doll knew the colour of the sweet in the box and what colour the do6 would think the sweet was. The main finding was that children tended to say the doll would hold a false belief about the colour of the sweet whenever the doll had not looked in the box. This result is easily reconciled with the theory view as a drive for coherence within the different aspects (knowledge and belier predictions) of the child's theory of mind. The result is contrary to the simulation view because children were generally good at‘inputting’or taking account of the relevant information (i.e. the doll's knowledge of the sweets’colours and the message to the doll), because children assessed their own beliefs quite differently from the doll's beliefs, and because contrary to the default assumptions set out by Harris (1991) children found it easier to assign a false belief to the doll than to assign a true belief.
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Citations
Cites
Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development
Keil, F. C. (1989) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2065.001.0001 · Cited by 1,886
Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x · Cited by 1,158
Overregularization in language acquisition
Marcus, G. F., Pinker, S., Ullman, M., Hollander, M., Rosen, T. J., Xu, F., & Clahsen, H. (1992) · Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development · doi:10.2307/1166115 · Cited by 1,065
In defense of the simulation theory.
GOLDMAN, A. I. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00200.x · Cited by 516
Cited by
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x · Cited by 1,066
“Logically, if the infants had attributed only ignorance, they should have expected the actor to search in either of the two locations (rather than in one particular location), but in reality, research suggests that when attributing ignorance to an agent, young children expect the person to get the answer wrong, rather…”
BackgroundDissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R. (2006) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040 · Cited by 1,023
Carpendale, J. I. M., & Lewis, C. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000032 · Cited by 865
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0198236107.001.0001 · Cited by 773
Metadata
- Authors
- RUFFMAN, T.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996-12
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 388-414
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W1982264149
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 1.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- RUFFMAN, T. (1996). Do Children Understand the Mind by Means of Simulation or a Theory? Evidence From Their Understanding of Inference. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00053.x
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