Cited by 1,158Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceSocial Robot Interaction and HRI

Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory

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GOPNIK, ALISON, WELLMAN, HENRY M.·1992·Mind & Language

Abstract

How do children (and indeed adults) understand the mind?In this paper we contrast two accounts.One is the view that the child's early understanding of mind is an implicit theory analogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be understood as theory changes.The second is the view that the child need not really understand the mind, in the sense of having some set of beliefs about it.She bypasses conceptual understanding by operating a working model of the mind and reading its output.Fortunately, the child has such a model easily available, as all humans do, namely her own mind.The child's task is to learn how to apply this model to predict and explain others' mental states and actions.This is accomplished by running simulations on her working model, that is observing the output of her own mind, given certain inputs, and then applying the results to others.The first position has a certain prominence; research on children's understanding of mind has come to be called 'children's theory of mind'.This position is linked to certain philosophers of mind such as Churchland (1984) and Stich (1983) who characterize ordinary understanding of mind, our mentalistic folk psychology, as a theory.It is also part of a recent tendency to describe cognitive development as analogous to theory change in science (Carey, 1985(Carey, , 1988;;Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975; Wellman

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x

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  • The theory of mind network is a set of brain regions engaged when a person attempts to infer somebody's mental state, with or without language.

    “The most relevant to our current discussion is the theory of mind network [178], a set of brain regions that are engaged when their owner is attempting to infer somebody’s mental state (with our without the use of language; [179, 180]).”

    From Dissociating language and thought in large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [178]

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Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Astington, J. W. and Gopnik, A. 1991a: Developing Understanding of Desire and Intention. In A. Whiten (eds), Natural Theories of Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 39-50.
  2. Johnson, C. N. 1988: Theory of Mind and the Structure of Conscious Experi- ence. In J. Astington, P. Harris and D. Olson (eds.), Developing Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 47-63.
  3. Meltzoff, A. N. and Gopnik, A. In press: The Role of Imitation in Understand- ing Persons and Developing Theories of Mind. In s. Baron-Cohen and H. Tager-Flusberg (eds.), The Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  4. Moses, L. J. 1990: Young Children's Understanding of Intention and Belief. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.
  5. Perner, J., Leekam, S. R. and Wimmer, H. 1987: Three-year-olds' Difficulty with False Belief. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 125-37.
  6. Pemer, J. 1991: Understanding the Represenfational Mind. Cambridge, MA.: MIT
  7. Searle, J. R. 1983: Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  8. Trevarthen, C. and Hubley, P. 1978: Secondary Intersubjectivity: Confidence, Confiders, and Acts of Meaning in the First Year of Life. In A. Lock (ed.), Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication. New York: Academic Press.

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Authors
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M.
Affiliations
University of Michigan (US)
Venue
Mind & Language
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1992-03
Volume
7
Issue
1-2
Pages
145-171
ISSN
  • 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0017
OpenAlex
W2159056499
Cited by
1,158
References
65
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 56 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 83 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 32
FWCI
86.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Mind & Language (publishedVersion)
  • Deep Blue (University of Michigan) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (8919916)
  • Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University
  • Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
theory of mind, children, mental representation, folk psychology, cognitive development

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