The Folk Psychology of Consciousness*
Abstract
This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non-conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious state attributions only for those entities that typically display the simple features identified in the AGENCY model (eyes, distinctive motion, interaction) and took longer to deny conscious states to those entities.
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AI researchers' and the public's folk conceptions of mental capacities may differ from those of experts who study the science and philosophy of mind.
“AI researchers' and the public's folk conceptions of mental capacities may differ from con- ceptions of experts who study the science and philosophy of mind”
From Subjective Experience in AI Systems: What Do AI Researchers and the Public Believe? (2025) · cites this paper as Arico et al. 2011
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734 · see citing works
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540 · see citing works
An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416950 · Cited by 3,340 · see citing works
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Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227 · see citing works
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Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227 · see citing works
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
“’ ) [58,59,98] and the degree to which it should be respected (see further discussion with respect to the iterative NK strategy; Box 4). speci fi city and sensitivity need not be correlated.”
BackgroundFolk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models
Colombatto, C., & Fleming, S. M. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae013 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Do You Mind? User Perceptions of Machine Consciousness
Scott, A. E., Neumann, D., Niess, J., & Woźniak, P. W. (2023) · Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3544548.3581296 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Subjective Experience in AI Systems: What Do AI Researchers and the Public Believe?
Dreksler, N., Caviola, L., Chalmers, D., Allen, C., Rand, A., Lewis, J., Waggoner, P., Mays, K., & Sebo, J. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.11945 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
- Authors
- ARICO, A., FIALA, B., GOLDBERG, R. F., & NICHOLS, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Arizona (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- ARICO, ADAM
- ORCID
- NICHOLS, SHAUN
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 327-352
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2000852526
- Cited by
- 102
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 8.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind & Language (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
- Keywords
- folk psychology, consciousness, principal-agent model, mental state attribution
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