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Cited by 7,734Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceCognitive Science and Education ResearchPsychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience

The Modularity of Mind

Fodor, Jerry A.·1983·The MIT Press eBooks
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001
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Abstract

This study synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new and exciting theory of mind. Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory and information flow; Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviors. This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes. One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in artificial intelligence. Bradford Books imprint

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  • Classical views treat perception as a passive internal process in which the brain receives sensory input, processes it, and issues commands for action.

    “This contrasts with classical views that treat perception as a passive internal process in which the brain receives sensory input, processes it, and issues commands for action.”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983

  • Classical representationalist views frame perception as a passive process where sensory input is transformed into internal representations of the world, which function as stand-ins for the environment.

    “Enactive perspectives contrast with classical representationalist views, in which perception is framed as a passive process where sensory input is transmitted through the body's sensory apparatus and transformed into internal representations of the world.”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983

  • Phenomenal transparency-opacity is cognitively impenetrable.

    “which implies that phenomenal transparency-opacity is ‘cognitively impenetrable’”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983

  • Gauthier and colleagues have emphasized a domain-general, but process-specific, understanding of FFA activity.

    “In other words, in contrast with earlier proposals, Gauthier and colleagues have emphasized a domain-general, but process-specific, understanding of FFA activity (for an extended discussion of domain-general vs. domain-specific cognitive processing, see Fodor 1983).”

    From Activity in Right Temporo-Parietal Junction is Not Selective for Theory-of-Mind (2008) · cites this paper as Fodor 1983

  • Comparator models are ultimately functionalist in nature; particular behaviours are explained by appeal to a revision of modality-specific prediction errors, as computed by encapsulated, physically localized brain modules, without specifying a particular computational implementation.

    “Such models are thus ultimately functionalist in nature; particular behaviours are explained by appeal to a revision of modality-specific prediction errors, as computed by encapsulated, physically localized brain modules, without specifying a particular computational implementation (Fodor 1983).”

    From From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2018) · cites this paper as Fodor 1983

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Authors
Fodor, J. A.
Corresponding author
Fodor, Jerry A.
Venue
The MIT Press eBooks
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
1983-04-06
DOI
10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001
OpenAlex
W2888882506
Cited by
7,734
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 232 · 2025: 241 · 2024: 224 · 2023: 181 · 2022: 186 · 2021: 192 · 2020: 252 · 2019: 402 · 2018: 243 · 2017: 205 · 2016: 180 · 2015: 196 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 181 · 2012: 178
FWCI
87.69
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • UCLA - Biblioteca de Ciencias y Tecnologia Felix Morales Bueno (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
Keywords
modularity of mind, Jerry Fodor, theory of mind, cognitive architecture, faculty psychology, computational theory of mind, artificial intelligence, cognitive processes

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