Cited by 69Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceTheology and Philosophy of Evil

PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENTS FOR MULTIPLE UNIVERSES

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DRAPER, KAI, DRAPER, PAUL, PUST, JOEL·2007·Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's “this universe” objection to a standard fine‐tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a “Cartesian argument” for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly plausible assumptions about evidence and epistemic probability, the proposition which it treats as evidence cannot coherently be regarded as evidence for anything. This raises the question of whether to reject the assumptions or accept that such a proposition cannot be evidence.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00293.x

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  • A careful analysis of TER reveals putative counterexamples to TER not to be genuine counterexamples.

    “In my view, a careful analysis of TER reveals these not to be genuine counterexamples (Draper, 2020; Draper et al., 2007).”

    From Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse? (2024) · cites this paper as Draper et al., 2007

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Authors
DRAPER, K., DRAPER, P., & PUST, J.
Affiliations
  • University of Delaware (US)
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Venue
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2007-08-20
Volume
88
Issue
3
Pages
288-307
ISSN
  • 0031-5621 (ISSN-L)
  • 0279-0750
  • 1468-0114
OpenAlex
W2094138420
Cited by
69
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2
FWCI
2.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Pacific philosophical quarterly (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Keywords
multiverse, fine-tuning argument, total evidence, cosmological argument, epistemic probability, evidence, philosophy of cosmology

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