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Cited by 32Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy, Science, and History

In Defense of the Requirement of Total Evidence

Draper, Paul·2020·Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1086/706084
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Abstract

According to the Requirement of Total Evidence, when assessing the credibility of hypotheses, we should endeavor to take into account all of the relevant evidence at our disposal instead of just some proper part of that evidence. In “The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence,” Peter Fisher Epstein offers two alleged counterexamples to this requirement. I show that, on at least one very natural interpretation of the requirement, his alleged counterexamples are not genuine. I close by explaining why this conclusion is important.

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Crossref · 10.1086/706084

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6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • A careful analysis of TER reveals putative counterexamples to TER not to be genuine counterexamples.

    “In my view, a careful analysis of TER reveals these not to be genuine counterexamples (Draper, 2020; Draper et al., 2007).”

    From Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse? (2024) · cites this paper as Draper, 2020

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Authors
Draper, P.
Corresponding author
Draper, Paul
ORCID
Draper, Paul
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2020-01
Volume
87
Issue
1
Pages
179-190
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
DOI
10.1086/706084
OpenAlex
W2971376782
Cited by
32
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 3
FWCI
4.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 731 d)
Locations
Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
Keywords
fine-tuning argument, evidence evaluation, counterexample, cosmological argument

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