The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
ACTING CONTRARY TO OUR PROFESSED BELIEFS OR THE GULF BETWEEN OCCURRENT JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONAL BELIEF
Abstract
People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in‐between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Searle, J. R. (1969) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173438 · Cited by 11,718
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317 · cited 1×
“…almost a truism in contemporary psychology, as suggested by the work of Nisbett and Wilson on self-knowledge of the processes driving our judgments (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Wilson 2002), the work of Damasio on the relationship between emotion and reason (Damasio 1994), and…”
BackgroundThe emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Ryle, G. (2006) · Theories of Mind · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,809
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Philosophical Investigations: Philosophische Untersuchungen
Burnheim, J., & Philosophical Studies, W. S. F. T. N. U. O. I. (1954) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.5840/philstudies1954421 · Cited by 2,902
Miller, G. A., & Cantor, N. (1982) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.1982.1.1.83 · Cited by 2,816
Cited by
Levy, N. (2021) · Bad Beliefs · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.003.0005 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- SCHWITZGEBEL, E.
- Venue
- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-12
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 531-553
- ISSN
- 0031-5621 (ISSN-L)
- 0279-0750
- 1468-0114
- OpenAlex
- W1513647630
- Cited by
- 414
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 87.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ACTING CONTRARY TO OUR PROFESSED BELIEFS OR THE GULF BETWEEN OCCURRENT JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONAL BELIEF. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x
- The paper
- SCHWITZGEBEL, E. (2010). ACTING CONTRARY TO OUR PROFESSED BELIEFS OR THE GULF BETWEEN OCCURRENT JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONAL BELIEF. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.