The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection
Abstract
We derive a precautionary demand for international reserves in the presence of sovereign risk and show that political‐economy considerations modify the optimal level of reserve holdings. A greater chance of opportunistic behaviour by future policy makers and political corruption reduce the demand for international reserves and increase external borrowing. We provide evidence to support these findings. Consequently, the debt‐to‐reserves ratio may be less useful as a vulnerability indicator. A version of the Lucas Critique suggests that if a high debt‐to‐reserves ratio is a symptom of opportunistic behaviour, a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare‐reducing.
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Citations
Cites
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
Cited by
The high demand for international reserves in the Far East: What is going on?
Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (2003) · Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · doi:10.1016/s0889-1583(03)00008-x · Cited by 325
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aizenman, J., & Marion, N.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-06-23
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 497
- Pages
- 569-591
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W3125587787
- Cited by
- 232
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 23.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (2004). International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00232.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
