The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social Connections and Group Banking
Open accessAbstract
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA‐Peru, I exploit a quasi‐random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint‐liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or being of a similar culture) have higher repayment and higher savings. Furthermore, I observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default, and that through successful monitoring, individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Can Social Cohesion be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence from Group Lending in Guatemala
Wydick, B. (1999) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00457 · Cited by 333
Cited by
The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance
Feigenberg, B., Field, E., & Pande, R. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt016 · Cited by 292
(2011) · The University of Bath Online Publications Store (The University of Bath) · Cited by 284
Metadata
- Authors
- Karlan, D. S.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-02-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 517
- Pages
- F52-F84
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2066593412
- Cited by
- 501
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 55.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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