The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States
Abstract
Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful‐discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment‐level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful‐discharge protection reduces employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, plants engage in capital deepening and experience a decline in total factor productivity, indicative of altered production techniques. Evidence of strong contemporaneous growth in employment, however, leads us to view our findings as suggestive but tentative.
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Citations
Cites
Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1994) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297896 · Cited by 3,840
Equilibrium Unemployment Theory
Parai, A. K., & Pissarides, C. A. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060212 · Cited by 3,194
Berman, E., Bound, J., & Griliches, Z. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118467 · Cited by 1,870 · cited 1×
“…introduction of this exception.26 This differential rise in non-production demand may be explained by capital–skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969; Berman et al., 1994), as 26 These results are robust to various specifications and to the exclusion of California and Arizona, even though Arizona…”
Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries
Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J., & Samuelson, L. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555454 · Cited by 1,651
Autor, D. H. (2003) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/344122 · Cited by 1,534
Self-citationJob Security Provisions and Employment
Lazear, E. P. (1990) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937895 · Cited by 1,301
Griliches, Z. (1969) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1926439 · Cited by 1,122
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits
Summers, L. H. (1989) · American Economic Review · Cited by 653
The NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database
Bartelsman, E., & Gray, W. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0205 · Cited by 547
Cited by
Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality
Tsounta, E., Suphaphiphat, N., Ricka, F., Dabla-Norris, E., & Kochhar, K. (2015) · Staff Discussion Notes · doi:10.5089/9781513555188.006 · Cited by 710
Entrepreneurship as Experimentation
Kerr, W. R., Nanda, R., & Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.3.25 · Cited by 704
Self-citationDemocratizing entry: Banking deregulations, financing constraints, and entrepreneurship☆
Kerr, W. R., & Nanda, R. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.12.003 · Cited by 679
Self-citationFiring Costs and Capital Structure Decisions
SERFLING, M. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12403 · Cited by 617
Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation
Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht009 · Cited by 579
Metadata
- Authors
- Autor, D. H., Kerr, W. R., & Kugler, A. D.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-06-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 521
- Pages
- F189-F217
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2125129154
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 65.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Autor, D. H., Kerr, W. R., & Kugler, A. D. (2007). Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02055.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.