The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?
Abstract
The UK National Health Service introduced a pay for performance scheme for primary care providers in 2004/5. The scheme rewarded providers for the proportion of eligible patients who received appropriate treatment. Eligible patients were those who had been reported by the provider as having the relevant disease minus those they exception reported as not suitable for treatment. Using rich provider level data, we find that differences in reported disease rates between providers, and differences in exception rates both between and within providers, suggest gaming. Faced with ratio performance indicators, providers acted on denominators as well as numerators. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2010.
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Cites
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Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139013567 · Cited by 6,640
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
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Kreif, N., Grieve, R., Hangartner, D., Turner, A. J., Nikolova, S., & Sutton, M. (2016) · Health Economics · doi:10.1002/hec.3258 · Cited by 301
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gravelle, H., Sutton, M., & Ma, A.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-01-20
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 542
- Pages
- F129-F156
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2056230710
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 22.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gravelle, H., Sutton, M., & Ma, A. (2010). Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding? The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02340.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
