Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline?
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Abstract
type="main" xml:lang="en"> The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences, but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions – mechanisms and rules of the budget process – that create checks and balances have significant value in curbing fiscal pressures even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavourable. — Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody
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Cites
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Baltagi, B. H. (2021) · Springer Texts in Business and Economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5 · Cited by 15,104
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation
Franzese, R. J. (1999) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991831 · Cited by 253
Cited by
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Hallerberg, M., Rainer Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759505 · Cited by 405
Acemoglu, D. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105775362069 · Cited by 284
What should fiscal councils do?
Calmfors, L., & Wren-Lewis, S. (2011) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.00273.x · Cited by 261
Metadata
- Authors
- Fabrizio, S., & Mody, A.
- Venue
- Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-10-01
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 48
- Pages
- 690-739
- ISSN
- 0266-4658 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0327
- OpenAlex
- W1981037155
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 31.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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