The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Abstract
In this essay, I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.
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Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
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La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
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Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
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Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
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Hotelling, H. (1929) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2224214 · Cited by 6,861
Cited by
Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance
Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. H. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2007.09.001 · Cited by 858
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Decentralization and political institutions
Enikolopov, R., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.006 · Cited by 502
Institutions, Human Capital, and Development*
Acemoglu, D., Gallego, F. A., & Robinson, J. A. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041119 · Cited by 502
Self-citationTied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1025-1048
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2136399506
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 59
- FWCI
- 39.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/002205105775362069
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- Acemoglu, D. (2005). Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Journal of Economic Literature. https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362069
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.