The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE PARADOX OF POWER*
Abstract
In power struggles, the strong might be expected to grow ever stronger and the weak weaker still. But in actuality, poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative to richer or larger ones. This is the paradox of power. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. Only when the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of achieved income. Among other things, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor.
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Cites
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society
Keating, B., Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., & Tullock, G. (1982) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1058683 · Cited by 2,544
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A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
Grossman, H. I. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 808
POLACHEK, S. W. (1980) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200278002400103 · Cited by 670
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success
Hirshleifer, J. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00153394 · Cited by 564
Self-citationBlainey, G. (1973) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-01690-7 · Cited by 363
The analytics of continuing conflict
Hirshleifer, J. (1988) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00869589 · Cited by 332
Self-citationRetreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War.
Campbell, D., Mueller, J., Seabury, P., & Codevill, A. (1990) · The Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/2078775 · Cited by 202
Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium
Garfinkel, M. R. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 189
Cited by
Greed and grievance in civil war
Collier, P. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 · Cited by 6,101
Skaperdas, S. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213906 · Cited by 1,342
The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1998) · The Political Dimension of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_3 · Cited by 1,002
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2355 · Cited by 815
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/601453 · Cited by 620
Metadata
- Authors
- Hirshleifer, J.
- Venue
- Economics & Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991-11
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 177-200
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W2063512294
- Cited by
- 505
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 9.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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