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Cited by 232

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories

Open access
Edmans, Alex, Gabaix, Xavier·2009·European Financial Management

Abstract

Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture several complexities of real‐life settings. This article surveys recent theories that extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and show that the above features can be fully consistent with efficiency. For example, optimal contracting theories can explain the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level of incentives and their negative scaling with firm size, pay‐for‐luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00500.x

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Metadata

Authors
Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X.
Venue
European Financial Management
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-05-26
Volume
15
Issue
3
Pages
486-496
ISSN
  • 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-036X
OpenAlex
W2135453952
Cited by
232
References
1
FWCI
81.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00500.x
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Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X. (2009). Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories. European Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00500.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.