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Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
Open accessAbstract
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture several complexities of real‐life settings. This article surveys recent theories that extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and show that the above features can be fully consistent with efficiency. For example, optimal contracting theories can explain the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level of incentives and their negative scaling with firm size, pay‐for‐luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk.
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Citations
Cites
Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment
Kuhnen, C. M., & Zwiebel, J. H. (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.972622 · Cited by 116
Cited by
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting
GERVAIS, S., HEATON, J. B., & ODEAN, T. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01686.x · Cited by 538
Board diversity, corporate governance, corporate performance, and executive pay
Sarhan, A. A., Ntim, C. G., & Al‐Najjar, B. (2019) · International Journal of Finance & Economics · doi:10.1002/ijfe.1690 · Cited by 326
CEO Ability, Pay, and Firm Performance
Chang, Y. Y., Dasgupta, S., & Hilary, G. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1205 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X.
- Venue
- European Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-05-26
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 486-496
- ISSN
- 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-036X
- OpenAlex
- W2135453952
- Cited by
- 232
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 81.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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