The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes
Abstract
Using data on teacher contract negotiations under final‐offer arbitration, this paper investigates the causes of impasses in contract negotiations and finds some support for each of three perspectives: game‐theoretic, psychological, and political. The large number of “consent awards” suggests that negotiators frequently wish to avoid the political costs of a compromise settlement, preferring to blame arbitrators for the outcome. The positive correlation between the probability of an impasse and the variance in comparable negotiated settlements suggests that the parties base their judgments of fairness using evidence most consistent with their own position.
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The Babcock and Olson (1992) evidence can be interpreted as showing that when there are numerous potential comparison groups to assess fairness, the parties focus on those that favor themselves.
“This evidence can be interpreted in the same way as our field study of Pennsylvania teachers mentioned earlier; when there are numerous potential comparison groups to assess fairness, the parties focus on those that favor themselves.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Babcock and Olson (1992)
In Babcock and Olson (1992), increases in the variation of wage settlements within a district's athletic conference increased the probability that the district failed to negotiate a contract and ended up using arbitration.
“In a field study examining the use of arbitration in contract negotiations for public school teachers in Wisconsin, Babcock and Olson (1992) found that increases in the variation of wage settlements within a district's athletic conference increased the probability that the district failed to negotiate a contract and ended up using arbitration.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Babcock and Olson (1992)
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Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.1.109 · Cited by 1,071 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- BABCOCK, L. C., & OLSON, C. A.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Venue
- Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992-03
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 348-360
- ISSN
- 0019-8676 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-232X
- OpenAlex
- W2093526585
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 1.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Industrial Relations A Journal of Economy and Society (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Labor Movements and Unions
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Conflict Management and Negotiation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Legal and Labor Studies
- Keywords
- final-offer arbitration, fairness judgments, political negotiation
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