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Cited by 230Economic Sanctions and International RelationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyDefense, Military, and Policy Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

Bapat, Navin A., Clifton Morgan, T.·2009·International Studies Quarterly
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x
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Abstract

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions “work” more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testing utilizing the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data. Somewhat surprisingly, the analyses using these new data support the intuition of policymakers; that is, multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions. Our results do support one theoretical argument, based on spatial models, that we test. This explanation holds that whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved. Our analyses provide support for these hypotheses.

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Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Barfield, 1998, Unilateral Sanctions undermine U.S. Interests, The World and I, 13, 92
  2. Heston, 2006, Penn World Table Version 6.2
  3. Hufbauer, 1990, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
  4. Hufbauer, 2007, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
  5. Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony
  6. Kranish, 2000, Boston Globe
  7. Marshall, 2002, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2002
  8. Nurnberger, 2003, Why Sanctions (almost) Never Work, The International Economy, 17, 71

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Metadata

Authors
Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T.
Affiliations
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
ORCID
Bapat, Navin A.
Venue
International Studies Quarterly
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2009-12
Volume
53
Issue
4
Pages
1075-1094
ISSN
  • 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2478
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x
OpenAlex
W1994873719
Semantic Scholar
8ebe480dee799f364ac684547aca743f19926fcd
Cited by
230
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
FWCI
16.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 2100 d)
Locations
International Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
Keywords
economic sanctions, multilateral sanctions, unilateral sanctions, sanctions effectiveness, spatial modeling, international institutions, issue salience

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