Cited by 230Economic Sanctions and International RelationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyDefense, Military, and Policy Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

Bapat, Navin A., Clifton Morgan, T.·2009·International Studies Quarterly

DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x

Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions “work” more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testing utilizing the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data. Somewhat surprisingly, the analyses using these new data support the intuition of policymakers; that is, multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions. Our results do support one theoretical argument, based on spatial models, that we test. This explanation holds that whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved. Our analyses provide support for these hypotheses.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x

Cites

37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110770 · Cited by 1,505
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010357 · Cited by 1,441
Penn World Table version 8.1
He, Z. (2020) · Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) · doi:10.17632/fxgy4rgbxv · Cited by 1,013
Economic sanctions reconsidered
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-5677 · Cited by 858
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Riker, W. H. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1960638 · Cited by 778
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
McKelvey, R. D. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911951 · Cited by 696
Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions
Signorino, C. S., & Ritter, J. M. (1999) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00113 · Cited by 673
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Riker, W. H. (1982) · Studies in public choice · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_1 · Cited by 640
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Hufbauer, G. C. (1985) · Cited by 471
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy
Diebold, W., Hufbauer, G. C., & Schott, J. J. (1985) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042595 · Cited by 466

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

Barfield, 1998, Unilateral Sanctions undermine U.S. Interests, The World and I, 13, 92
Heston, 2006, Penn World Table Version 6.2
Hufbauer, 1990, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Hufbauer, 2007, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony
Kranish, 2000, Boston Globe
Marshall, 2002, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2002
Nurnberger, 2003, Why Sanctions (almost) Never Work, The International Economy, 17, 71

Sorted by citations

Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice
Drezner, D. W. (2011) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x · Cited by 420
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset
Morgan, T., Bapat, N. A., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894213520379 · Cited by 371
“This is consistent with previous empirical research suggesting that multilateral sanctions are more likely to be effective than unilateral sanctions (Bapat and Morgan, 2009).”
BackgroundResultSelf-citation
The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?
Afesorgbor, S. K. (2018) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.06.002 · Cited by 237
The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States
Afesorgbor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.015 · Cited by 217
When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature
Peksen, D. (2019) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250 · Cited by 215
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000*
Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Krustev, V. (2009) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894208097668 · Cited by 202
Self-citation
Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field
Hafner-Burton, E. M., Victor, D. G., & Lupu, Y. (2012) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.1.0047 · Cited by 199
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
Bapat, N. A., Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y., & Morgan, T. (2012) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.751298 · Cited by 187
Self-citation
Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges
Morgan, T. C., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2023) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.37.1.3 · Cited by 177
When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
Bapat, N. A., & Kwon, B. R. (2014) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000290 · Cited by 143
“Bapat and Morgan 2009.”
Self-citation
Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats
Whang, T., McLean, E. V., & Kuberski, D. W. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x · Cited by 131
Women and economic statecraft: The negative impact international economic sanctions visit on women
Drury, A., & Peksen, D. (2014) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066112448200 · Cited by 110
“See, for example, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), Martin (1992), Pape (1997), Drury (1998), Drezner (1999, 2003), Ang and Peksen (2007), Hufbauer et al. (2007), Bapat and Morgan (2009), and Peterson (forthcoming).”
Background
Profiting from Sanctions: Economic Coercion and US Foreign Direct Investment in Third-Party States
Barry, C. M., & Kleinberg, K. B. (2015) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081831500017x · Cited by 125
“See, most recently, Bapat and Morgan 2009; and McLean and Whang 2010. economic actors are not the only potential threat to a government’s sanctions efforts.”
Background
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ON GREEN INNOVATIONS
Fu, Q., Gong, Q., Zhao, X., et al. (2022) · Technological and Economic Development of Economy · doi:10.3846/tede.2022.17782 · Cited by 112
“Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999), Bapat and Morgan (2009), and Kazerooni et al. (2015) classified international sanctions into the following categories – unilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral – and analyzed the different impacts of these sanctions on several fields. It can be proved that multilateral sanctions often…”
BackgroundResultInfluential
How Sanctions Affect Public Opinion in Target Countries: Experimental Evidence From Israel
Grossman, G., Manekin, D. S., & Margalit, Y. M. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018774370 · Cited by 107
Reciprocity and the structural determinants of the international sanctions network
Cranmer, S., Heinrich, T., & Desmarais, B. A. (2013) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2013.01.001 · Cited by 104
“If such coordination is at play, as many studies have assumed (Martin, 1993; Drezner, 2000; Bapat and Morgan, 2009), then the sanctions by each of the senders against the target are not independent: the lead sender’s sanctioning efforts rendered the other sanctions more likely.”
BackgroundInfluential
Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1
Early, B. R. (2011) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00143.x · Cited by 101
FDI and sanctions: An empirical analysis of short- and long-run effects
Mirkina, I. (2018) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.05.008 · Cited by 98
The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear Latency
Mehta, R. N., & Whitlark, R. E. (2017) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx028 · Cited by 92
International sanctions’ impact on energy efficiency in target states
Chen, Y. E., Fu, Q., Zhao, X., et al. (2019) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2019.07.022 · Cited by 85
Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes
Grauvogel, J., Licht, A. A., & von Soest, C. (2017) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqw044 · Cited by 91
Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States
Early, B. R. (2011) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002711420961 · Cited by 83
The impact of the Russian Aggression against Ukraine on the Russia-EU Trade
Estrada, M. A. R., & Koutronas, E. (2022) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2022.06.004 · Cited by 74
Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy
Aidt, T. S., Facundo Albornoz, A., & Hauk, E. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201481 · Cited by 81
“Bapat and Kwon (2015) model the enforcement problem associated with a sanction policy that bans firms from the foreign power trading with the target country.”
Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior1
Peterson, T. M. (2012) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12017 · Cited by 70
The impact of financial sanctions: The case of Iran
Ghasseminejad, S., & Jahan‐Parvar, M. R. (2021) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2021.03.001 · Cited by 68
Do economic sanctions impair target economies?
Shin, G., Choi, S., & Luo, S. (2015) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512115590203 · Cited by 64
Sanctions and Alternate Markets
Peksen, D., & Peterson, T. (2016) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912915620049 · Cited by 41
Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation
Miller, N. L. (2017) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00293 · Cited by 61
The impact of international sanctions on energy security
Wen, J., Zhao, X., Wang, Q., et al. (2020) · Energy & Environment · doi:10.1177/0958305x20937686 · Cited by 56
“The main reason is that the United States and the European Union usually have conflicts of interest in imposing sanctions on target countries jointly, making such sanctions ineffective.(78) For example, Sun(79) indicated that in the new round of economic sanctions against Russia by the U.”
Background
The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
Battaglini, M., & Bård Harstad, Z. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/704610 · Cited by 59
The Power to Hurt and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions
Kavaklı, K. C., Chatagnier, J. T., & Hatipoğlu, E. (2019) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/707398 · Cited by 53
Combating Coups d’état in Africa, 1950–2014
Powell, J. M., Lasley, T. C., & Schiel, R. E. (2016) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6 · Cited by 51
“In this section we briefly discuss how international organizations, especially regional organizations like the AU, are expected to be more credible and capable sanctioners than other actors (Drezner, 2000; Bapat and Morgan, 2009).”
Background
Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness
Jeong, J. M., & Peksen, D. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002717728105 · Cited by 52
Economic Sanctions in Flux: Enduring Challenges, New Policies, and Defining the Future Research Agenda
Early, B. R., & Cilizoglu, M. (2020) · International Studies Perspectives · doi:10.1093/isp/ekaa002 · Cited by 52
The “Oil Weapon” Reversed? Sanctions Against Iran and U.S.‐EU Structural Power
de Graaf, T. V. (2013) · Middle East Policy · doi:10.1111/mepo.12040 · Cited by 48
Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success
Peksen, D. (2017) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1368258 · Cited by 45
Still Unjust, Just in Different Ways: How Targeted Sanctions Fall Short of Just War Theory's Principles
Early, B. R., & Schulzke, M. (2018) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viy012 · Cited by 45
How many hands to make sanctions work? Comparing EU and US sanctioning efforts
Weber, P., & Schneider, G. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103595 · Cited by 45
Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?
Early, B. R., & Spice, R. (2014) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/fpa.12038 · Cited by 44
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
McLean, E. V., Hinkkainen, K., la Calle, L. D., et al. (2016) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894216635023 · Cited by 44
“This logic and several empirical studies now indicate that sanctions, and particularly the threat of sanctions, may be a far more effective tool of coercion than previously believed (Allen, 2005; Bapat and Morgan, 2009; Early, 2011; McLean and Whang, 2010; Whang et al., 2013).”
MethodSelf-citation
Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion
Peterson, T. M. (2018) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894218797024 · Cited by 43
Domestic Interests, Democracy, and Foreign Policy Change
Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009037938 · Cited by 39
Success of economic sanctions threats: coercion, information and commitment
Walentek, D., Broere, J., Cinelli, M., Dekker, M., & Haslbeck, J. M. B. (2021) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2021.1860034 · Cited by 39
“In addition, scholars note a higher effectiveness of economic sanctions introduced through international organizations (IOs) (Bapat and Morgan 2009), which are very frequently multilateral, too (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014).”
Background
Cross-Network Weaponization in the Semiconductor Supply Chain
Beaumier, G., & Cartwright, M. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae003 · Cited by 50
Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine
Hellquist, E. (2016) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2016.1230591 · Cited by 38
“Opinions are split on whether international cooperation helps or hinders target-oriented effectiveness (see Portela 2010, 44, 98–99; Drezner 2000, 73; Miers and Morgan 2002; Hufbauer et al 1990, 95ff; Bapat and Morgan 2009, 1075).”
Background
Economic sanctions and official ethnic discrimination in target countries, 1950–2003
Peksen, D. (2014) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2014.920219 · Cited by 37
“2See Pape (1997), Drury (1998), Drezner (1999), Lektzian and Souva (2007), Hufbauer et al. (2007), Ang and Peksen (2007), Bapat and Morgan (2009), Mclean and Whang (2010), Early (2011). awareness of the humanitarian effects of sanctions in Iraq, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s,…”
Background
The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration1
Shannon, M., Morey, D. S., & Boehmke, F. J. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00629.x · Cited by 38
Stopping the legal flow of weapons
Erickson, J. L. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312470472 · Cited by 36
Market adjustments to import sanctions: lessons from Chinese restrictions on Australian trade, 2020–21
Ferguson, V. A., Waldron, S., & Lim, D. J. (2022) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2022.2090019 · Cited by 34
Using the Carrot as the Stick: US Foreign Aid and the Effectiveness of Sanctions Threats
Early, B. R., & Jadoon, A. (2019) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1093/fpa/orz007 · Cited by 32
International sanctions against Iran and Tehran's responses: political effects on the targeted regime
Borszik, O. (2015) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2015.1112951 · Cited by 32
“In this way, they have analysed the effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral sanctions (Bapat & Morgan, 2009) and of targeted and comprehensive sanctions (Drezner, 2011; Hufbauer et al., 2007, Lektzian & Souva, 2007; Peksen & Drury, 2010; Portela, 2014), as well as the importance of different…”
Background
The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation
Attia, H., Grauvogel, J., & von Soest, C. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565 · Cited by 31
Economic Sanctions Disruption on International Trade Patterns and Global Trade Dynamics: Analyzing the Effects of the European Union’s Sanctions on Russia
Doornich, J. B., & Raspotnik, A. (2020) · Journal of East-West Business · doi:10.1080/10669868.2020.1830912 · Cited by 30
Durable institution under fire? The NPT confronts emerging multipolarity
Gibbons, R. D., & Herzog, S. (2021) · Contemporary Security Policy · doi:10.1080/13523260.2021.1998294 · Cited by 32
Regime type, issues of contention, and economic sanctions: Re-evaluating the economic peace between democracies
Wallace, G. P. R. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313482339 · Cited by 28
International Sanctions and Russia’s Hotel Industry: The Impact on Business and Coping Mechanisms of Hoteliers
Ivanov, S. H., Sypchenko, L., & Webster, C. (2016) · Tourism Planning & Development · doi:10.1080/21568316.2016.1204358 · Cited by 27
The impact of international sanctions on innovation of target countries
Wen, J., Zhao, X., & Chang, C. (2022) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/ecpo.12231 · Cited by 29
Sanctions and Third-party Compliance with US Foreign Policy Preferences: An Analysis of Dual-use Trade
Peterson, T. M. (2021) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027211014945 · Cited by 26
How to sanction international wrongdoing? The design of EU restrictive measures
Meissner, K. L. (2022) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-022-09458-0 · Cited by 26
“From a theoretical perspective, the pathway is plausible as we know from scholarly research on sanctions that multilateral coalitions of restrictive measures make the latter more likely prone to success (Bapat & Morgan, 2009; Early & Spice, 2015; Weber & Schneider, 2020).”
Background
The role and welfare rationale of secondary sanctions: A theory and a case study of the US sanctions targeting Iran
Han, B. (2016) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894216650836 · Cited by 22
“Although I acknowledge the strategic importance of sanction costs (Baldwin, 1985: 107) that could potentially signal one’s resolve and convince one’s counterpart to acquiesce (Langlois and Langlois, 2010), I do not consider them in my model.”
Background
Energy sanctions in the global economy: Geopolitical disruptions, market fragmentation, innovation and green transition
Omokaro, G. O., Nafula, Z. S., Iloabuchi, N. E., et al. (2025) · International Journal of Innovation Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijis.2025.07.003 · Cited by 21
Economic sanctions outcomes: An information-driven explanation
Onder, M. (2021) · JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES · doi:10.14254/2071-8330.2021/14-2/3 · Cited by 20
“Further, sanctions are believed to more successful since the power reserves endowed by the sender will likely withstand more extended periods, as well as harsher economic and political conditions compared to target states with weak economies (Bapat & Morgan, 2009).”
Background
Coercive Assets? Foreign Direct Investment and the Use of Economic Sanctions
Kim, D. (2012) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.751305 · Cited by 20
Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?
Mertens, C. (2024) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae016 · Cited by 19
The Evolution of Databases in the Age of Targeted Sanctions
Portela, C., & Charron, A. (2022) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viac061 · Cited by 19
Secondary effects of financial sanctions: Bank compliance and economic isolation of non-target states
Newman, A. L., & Zhang, Q. (2023) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2023.2267051 · Cited by 20
“Previous research shows that multilateral sanctions are more likely to succeed than unilateral sanctions (Bapat et al., 2013; Bapat & Clifton Morgan, 2009), and sanctions are more likely to achieve intended goals when private actors (Morgan & Bapat, 2003; Shambaugh, 1999) and the target’s major…”
Background
Shadow Economies and the Success of Economic Sanctions: Explaining Why Democratic Targets Are Disadvantaged
Early, B. R., & Peksen, D. (2020) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1093/fpa/oraa005 · Cited by 18
Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions Reciprocity: Explaining Targets’ Counter-Sanctions
Peksen, D., & Jeong, J. M. (2021) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2021.1919831 · Cited by 18
“The existing literature notes that sanctions over salient issues are more likely to draw target compliance (Ang and Dursun 2007; Bapat and Clifton Morgan 2009; Bapat and Kwon 2015; Jeong and Peksen 2019).”
Background
Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence
Morgan, T. (2015) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710 · Cited by 18
Pressures From Home and Abroad: Economic Sanctions and Target Government Response to Domestic Campaigns
Liou, R. Y.-L., Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2022) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027221118249 · Cited by 17
Do sanction types affect the duration of economic sanctions? The case of foreign aid
Jeong, J. M. (2018) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512117753150 · Cited by 17
The convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran
Lohmann, S. (2016) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2016.1166479 · Cited by 17
“Otherwise, market forces in the form of substituting trading partners will undermine the intended effect of economic deprivation (Doxey 1987, 88–109; Mansfield 1994; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Chaitkin 2010, 15).”
Background
Economic Sanctions: Stylized Facts and Quantitative Evidence
Felbermayr, G. J., Morgan, T., Syropoulos, C. A., & Yotov, Y. V. (2025) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-081623-020909 · Cited by 26
Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing
Cilizoglu, M., & Bapat, N. A. (2018) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894218783296 · Cited by 16
“Multilateral sanctions tend to be more effective than unilateral ones (Bapat and Morgan, 2009), especially if the target country’s major trading partners support the sanctioning efforts (McLean and Whang, 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance
Dorff, C., & Minhas, S. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1221679 · Cited by 17
Sticks and Stones: Sanction Threats, Impositions, and Their Effect on International Trade
Kohl, T., & Reesink, C. K. (2019) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11703.003.0007 · Cited by 15
“When using the TIES dataset, Bapat & Morgan (2009) found that, in contrast to the results that were produced with the HSE dataset, multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions.”
Result
Trade Composition and Acquiescence to Sanction Threats
Akoto, W., Peterson, T. M., & Thies, C. G. (2019) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912919837608 · Cited by 15
When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type
Zarpli, O. (2022) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027221139809 · Cited by 14
On the Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis by Using Duration Models
Caetano, J., Galego, A., & Caleiro, A. (2023) · Economies · doi:10.3390/economies11050136 · Cited by 14
“Furthermore, Bapat and Morgan (2009), via an empirical approach, argue that multilateral sanctions seem to have a greater probability of success than unilateral ones.”
Background
Reinforcing inequalities: A critical examination of international sanctions and bureaucratic decline in the Global South
Ko, J., Leung, C. K., & Yu, C. (2024) · Research in Globalization · doi:10.1016/j.resglo.2024.100258 · Cited by 14
Feeble rules: one dual-use sanctions regime, multiple ways of implementation and application?
Meissner, K. L., & Urbanski, K. (2021) · European Security · doi:10.1080/09662839.2021.1993189 · Cited by 14
Sanctions and economic growth: Do sanction diversity and level of development matter?
Alhassan, A., sabzehmeidani, A. S., Taha, A., et al. (2023) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e19571 · Cited by 13
“[36], suggest that multilateral sanctions inflict greater harm and reduces the possibility of the substitutions of economic sources for the target state and hence, induces compliance.”
Background
The Enforcement of U.S. Economic Sanctions and Global De-risking Behavior
Early, B. R., & Peterson, T. M. (2023) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231214748 · Cited by 13
“If sanctions regimes are multilateral and/or have the support of an international organization, that can increase their efficacy as well (Drezner 2000; Morgan and Bapat 2009; McLean and Whang 2010).”
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Bapat, N. A., De la Calle, L., Hinkkainen, K. H., & McLean, E. V. (2016) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/683257 · Cited by 39
Self-citation
Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions
Borzyskowski, I. V., & Portela, C. (2023) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231153565 · Cited by 11
“The more third parties ‘ gang up ’ against the target, the fewer alternative sources remain for the target to replace trade and aid ﬂ ows, and the more economic pressure accumulates (Doxey 1987), enhancing sanctions effectiveness (Bapat and Morgan 2009; Hufbauer et al. 2007).”
Background
US Economic Sanctions Against China: A Cultural Explanation of Sanction Effectiveness
Li, Y. (2014) · Asian perspective · doi:10.1353/apr.2014.0013 · Cited by 11
Making Dictators’ Pockets Empty: How Do U.S. Sanctions Influence Social Policies in Autocratic Countries?
Cho, W. (2017) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1392832 · Cited by 11
“Bapat and Morgan (2009) also find that ‘multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions’ because they have ‘the potential to create more coercive power than unilateral sanctions.’”
Background
Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power
Mr., A. G. (2011) · Cited by 11
Barriers to child vaccination: The role of international sanctions
Ko, J., Leung, C. K., Lee, H. F., et al. (2024) · SSM - Population Health · doi:10.1016/j.ssmph.2024.101723 · Cited by 10
““ -^ ” denotes that not all lagged years show a negative association. sanctions are generally less effective than unilateral sanctions, as evidenced by studies like Bapat and Morgan (2009) and Wen et al. (2021).”
The Unintended Consequences of Financial SanctionsPreprint
Keerati, R. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4049281 · Cited by 10
Monitoring the Monitor? Selective Responses to Human Rights Transgressions
Attia, H., & Grauvogel, J. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqad014 · Cited by 9
Sanctions and target public opinion: Experimental evidence from Turkey
Zarpli, O. (2023) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2023.2184814 · Cited by 9
“For example, some studies show that sanctions by international organizations (IOs) can be more effective (e.g. Bapat and Clifton Morgan 2009).”
Background
Circumventing Sovereignty: Extraterritorial Sanctions Leveraging the Technologies of the Financial System
Jaeger, M. D. (2021) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12436 · Cited by 9
Taming Neighbors: Exploring China's Economic Statecraft to Change Neighboring Countries' Policies and Their Effects
Kwon, J. (2020) · Asian perspective · doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0006 · Cited by 9
Talking to the hand: Bargaining, strategic interaction, and economic sanctions
Morgan, T., & Kobayashi, Y. (2021) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103685 · Cited by 8
Effectiveness of Sanctions in International Politics
Силаева, В. А. (2021) · MGIMO Review of International Relations · doi:10.24833/2071-8160-2021-4-79-136-153 · Cited by 8
International Sanctions against Iran under President Ahmadinejad: Explaining Regime PersistencePreprint
Borszik, O. (2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 8
Coercive Diplomacy and the New Financial Levers: Evaluating the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Financial SanctionsPreprint
Feaver, P. D., & Lorber, E. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1661963 · Cited by 8
Economic Coercion
McLean, E. V. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793519.013.2 · Cited by 7

Authors: Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T.
Affiliations: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
ORCID: Bapat, Navin A.
Venue: International Studies Quarterly
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published: 2009-12
Volume: 53
Issue: 4
Pages: 1075-1094
ISSN: 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
1468-2478
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x
OpenAlex: W1994873719
Semantic Scholar: 8ebe480dee799f364ac684547aca743f19926fcd
Cited by: 230
References: 38
Citations by year: 2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
FWCI: 16.47
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 2100 d)
Locations: International Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
Keywords: economic sanctions, multilateral sanctions, unilateral sanctions, sanctions effectiveness, spatial modeling, international institutions, issue salience

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

Abstract

Overview

Integrity signals

Verification

Claims the paper makes

Claims other papers make about this one

Citations

Cites

Cited by

Related

Metadata

Record

About these checks