Cited by 230Economic Sanctions and International RelationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyDefense, Military, and Policy Studies

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Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

Bapat, Navin A., Clifton Morgan, T.·2009·International Studies Quarterly

DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x

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Abstract

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions “work” more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testing utilizing the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data. Somewhat surprisingly, the analyses using these new data support the intuition of policymakers; that is, multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions. Our results do support one theoretical argument, based on spatial models, that we test. This explanation holds that whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved. Our analyses provide support for these hypotheses.

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Ivanovna, S. O. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4797730
The Impact of US and UN Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of the Target State: Evidence from a Bayesian Approach
Mkhwanazi, S. N., Zungu, L. T., & Kaseeram, I. (2024) · Business, management and economics · doi:10.5772/intechopen.1004854

Authors: Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T.
Affiliations: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
ORCID: Bapat, Navin A.
Venue: International Studies Quarterly
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published: 2009-12
Volume: 53
Issue: 4
Pages: 1075-1094
ISSN: 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
1468-2478
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x
OpenAlex: W1994873719
Semantic Scholar: 8ebe480dee799f364ac684547aca743f19926fcd
Cited by: 230
References: 38
Citations by year: 2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
FWCI: 16.47
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 2100 d)
Locations: International Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
Keywords: economic sanctions, multilateral sanctions, unilateral sanctions, sanctions effectiveness, spatial modeling, international institutions, issue salience

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Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

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