The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
Abstract
What explains the substantial variation in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) lending policies over time and across cases? Some scholars argue that the IMF is the servant of the United States and other powerful member-states, while others contend that the Fund's professional staff acts independently in pursuit of its own bureaucratic interests. I argue that neither of these perspectives, on its own, fully and accurately explains IMF lending behavior. Rather, I propose a “common agency” theory of IMF policymaking, in which the Fund's largest shareholders—the G5 countries that exercise de facto control over the Executive Board (EB)—act collectively as its political principal. Using this framework, I argue that preference heterogeneity among G5 governments is a key determinant of variation in IMF loan size and conditionality. Under certain conditions, preference heterogeneity leads to either conflict or “logrolling” within the EB among the Fund's largest shareholders, while in others it creates scope for the IMF staff to exploit “agency slack” and increase its autonomy. Statistical analysis of an original data set of 197 nonconcessional IMF loans to 47 countries from 1984 to 2003 yields strong support for this framework and its empirical predictions. In clarifying the politics of IMF lending, the article sheds light on the merits of recent policy proposals to reform the Fund and its decision-making rules. More broadly, it furthers our understanding of delegation, agency, and the dynamics of policymaking within international organizations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpi014 · Cited by 6,223
Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata
Guzmán, J. (2013) · Puerto Rico health sciences journal · Cited by 5,304
Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata
Long, J. S., & Jeremy Freese, A. (2014) · Cited by 4,624
Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference
Ho, D. E., Imai, K., King, G., & Stuart, E. A. (2007) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpl013 · Cited by 4,205
Large sample properties of matching estimators for average treatment effects
Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00655.x · Cited by 2,908
Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991857 · Cited by 2,471
Leuven, E., & Sianesi, B. (2003) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,168
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
Cited by
Reeves, A., McKee, M., Basu, S., & Stuckler, D. (2014) · Health Policy · doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.11.008 · Cited by 278
Lütz, S., & Kranke, M. (2014) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.747104 · Cited by 254
A Thousand Cuts: Social Protection in the Age of Austerity
Kentikelenis, A., & Stubbs, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190637736.001.0001 · Cited by 94
Greening global governance: INGO secretariats and environmental mainstreaming of IOs, 1950 to 2017
Dörfler, T., & Heinzel, M. (2023) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-022-09462-4 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Copelovitch, M. S.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 49-77
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W3121991912
- Cited by
- 358
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 111.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00577.x
- The paper
- Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00577.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.