Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
If that demanding epistemic principle is correct, it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism.
“The problem is that it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism if this idea is correct”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Kelly 2008
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- KELLY, T.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- KELLY, THOMAS
- ORCID
- KELLY, THOMAS
- Venue
- Midwest Studies In Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-78
- ISSN
- 0363-6550 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-4975
- OpenAlex
- W2038183313
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 9.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Midwest Studies in Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- common sense, epistemic justification, skepticism, evidence, epistemology of perception, anti-skepticism
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review