The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries
Open accessAbstract
This article tests expectations generated by the veto players theory with respect to the over time composition of budgets in a multidimensional policy space. The theory predicts that countries with many veto players (i.e., coalition governments, bicameral political systems, presidents with veto) will have difficulty altering the budget structures. In addition, countries that tend to make significant shifts in government composition will have commensurate modifications of the budget. Data collected from 19 advanced industrialized countries from 1973 to 1995 confirm these expectations, even when one introduces socioeconomic controls for budget adjustments like unemployment variations, size of retired population and types of government (minimum winning coalitions, minority or oversized governments). The methodological innovation of the article is the use of empirical indicators to operationalize the multidimensional policy spaces underlying the structure of budgets. The results are consistent with other analyses of macroeconomic outcomes like inflation, budget deficits and taxation that are changed at a slower pace by multiparty governments.
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Cites
Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties
Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., & James Chu, C.-S. (2002) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(01)00098-7 · Cited by 12,849
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
The institutional environment for economic growth
Henisz, W. J. (2000) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00066 · Cited by 1,651
Cited by
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing
Thomson, R., Royed, T., Naurin, E., Artés, J., Costello, R., Ennser‐Jedenastik, L., Ferguson, M., Kostadinova, P., Moury, C., Pétry, F., et al. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12313 · Cited by 402
Kim, C. (., Pantzalis, C., & Chul Park, J. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.007 · Cited by 281
Curini, L., Jou, W., & Memoli, V. (2012) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123411000275 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsebelis, G., & Chang, E. C. C.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Research
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 449-476
- ISSN
- 0304-4130 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6765
- OpenAlex
- W2092646922
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 17.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Tsebelis, G., & Chang, E. C. C. (2004). Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries. European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00161.x
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