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Cited by 584

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?

Open access
ERICKSON, MERLE, HANLON, MICHELLE, MAYDEW, EDWARD L.·2006·Journal of Accounting Research

Abstract

We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock-based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1475-679x.2006.00194.x

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Metadata

Authors
ERICKSON, M., HANLON, M., & MAYDEW, E. L.
Venue
Journal of Accounting Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-03
Volume
44
Issue
1
Pages
113-143
ISSN
  • 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
  • 1475-679X
OpenAlex
W2053121708
Cited by
584
References
1
FWCI
87.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2006.00194.x
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ERICKSON, M., HANLON, M., & MAYDEW, E. L. (2006). Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud? Journal of Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2006.00194.x

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.