The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?
Abstract
We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results.
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Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure: empirical evidence from Germany
Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K., & Verbeeten, F. (2011) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-010-0052-3 · Cited by 926
Glaum, M., Schmidt, P., Street, D. L., & Vogel, S. (2013) · Accounting and Business Research · doi:10.1080/00014788.2012.711131 · Cited by 241
The BP Oil Spill: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Environmental Disclosures
Heflin, F., & Wallace, D. (2017) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/jbfa.12244 · Cited by 116
Metadata
- Authors
- CHEN, S., CHEN, X., & CHENG, Q.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-03-28
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 499-536
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W3123180589
- Cited by
- 532
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 62.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CHEN, S., CHEN, X., & CHENG, Q. (2008). Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00288.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
